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Expert and Lay Mental Models of Ecosystems:
Inferences for Risk Communication*
Jeffrey K. Lazo, Jason Kinnell, Toby Bussa, Ann Fisher &
Nathan Collamer
Introduction
There is relatively little systematic information about how lay
people think about ecosystems and risks to them. For example, how do
they describe their perceptions of ecosystems and ecosystem changes?
Even less is known about the relative importance (i.e., values) laypeople
place on different types of ecosystem risks.
Also, little is known about how well lay and expert assessments
match. A mismatch may mean that policies advocated by one group
will not be supported by the other. Effective communication about
ecosystem risks can lead to more informed judgments by both.
The research reported here uses a mental modeling approach to
elicit and summarize similarities and differences between expert and lay
understandings of ecosystems. It is intended to be an initial step in
examining perceptions of values for ecosystem risks. Results of this
research suggests ways to improve ecological risk communication and
implement economic valuation of risks to ecosystems.
Linking Ecosystem Risks, Perceptionsand Values
Few researchers have examined communication about ecosystem
risks caused either by natural or anthropogenic factors.1 Most
*
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ecosystem risk communication data deal with specific animal species or
the loss of habitat to economic development. Understanding how
people perceive ecosystems and ecosystem changes would provide
useful input for linking models of ecosystem changes with models of
people's perceptions and preferences.
Modeling ecosystem changes requires understanding (1) how
ecosystems function and evolve, (2) how they react to forcing factors
ranging from natural events (e.g., a hurricane) to human actions (e.g.,
development of a wetland, or a spill of hazardous materials), and (3)
how socio-economic systems create and mitigate forcing factors as well
as adapt to the impacts that forcing factors present to ecosystems.
Identifying and understanding the relationships between people's
perceptions of ecosystems and their values for ecosystem changes builds
on interdisciplinary work in the social sciences. For example, input from
psychology helps in understanding how people perceive ecosystems and
ecological change. Political science and economics aid in exploring the
relative importance people place on different ecological risks, and
whether they are willing to take actions, such as voting, spending
money, or changing individual behavior to prevent undesirable (or
accelerate desirable) ecological changes. Understanding people's
preferences and values for ecosystem risks can provide guidance for
communicating effectively about them, as well as insights about what
risk mitigation policies they are likely to support.
There has been little attention to the intersection between
ecosystems and economic systems. 2 The most related valuation work
has focused on individual species within an ecosystem in one of four
manners: (1) indicator species, (2) threatened or endangered species, (3)
high-value marketable species, or (4) high profile (i.e., emotional)
Economics) from Pennsylvania State University.
1 See Alyce M. Ujihara, et al., Perception and Communication of Ecological Risks
(199 1) (unpublished report from Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, Center

for Risk Management); see also Michael J. Dover & Dominic Golding,

Communicating with the Public on Ecological Issues: Workshop Report, U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation (1995).
2

The work of the International Society for Ecological Economics (ISEE) and the

related publication, Ecological Economics, attempts to bring these two fields
together. See Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services

and Natural Capital,387 Nature 253 (1997), for an interesting approach to placing
values on all the Earth's ecosystem services.
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species. 3 Very little work has been targeted toward perceptions of
"ecosystems" as distinct from ecosystem components. A series of
articles by McDaniels et al. are the primary source of published work on
layperson and expert perceptions. The authors have subjects evaluate
hazard items on each of several psychometric scales for ecosystem
impacts concepts such as natural disaster incidence, biodiversity,
habitat, or recreation. 4 This method leads to a rating system and
quantitative analysis using multivariate statistical methods. McDaniels
et al. also report on perceptions of ecological risks from global change,
including climate change, ozone depletion, and species loss. 5 They
6
further examine perceptions of ecological risks to water resources.
In research reported here, we begin by eliciting both expert and lay
perceptions (or mental models) of ecosystems. Identifying and
comparing the models are essential for (1) communicating with
individuals about how different forcing factors might affect
ecosystems, (2) helping experts understand why ordinary citizens are
alarmed (or not alarmed) about specific ecosystem risks, and (3)
developing methods for eliciting lay individuals' values of these
impacts. 7 Without this knowledge, risk communication strategies
and valuation methods may be misguided and less effective.
Mental Modeling
There is no unified method for preparing, analyzing, and presenting
mental models. Bostrom et al. propose a four step process for using
mental models to identify differences between experts and laypeople:
"(a) create an expert influence diagram, (b) elicit laypeople's relevant
beliefs, (c) map those beliefs onto the diagram, and (d) identify gaps
3 See Dover & Golding, supra note 1, p.6. Bryan Norton has noted that many
people's values for ecosystem risks may be under the rocks" in the sense that they are
largely unconscious rather than clearly understood.
4 See Timothy McDaniels et al., CharacterizingPerception of Ecological Risk, 15
RiskAnal. 575 (1995).
5 See Timothy McDaniels et al., Perceived Ecological Risks of Global Change, 6
Global Environmental Change 159 (1996).
6 See Timothy McDaniels et al., Perception of Ecological Risks to Water
Environments, 17 RiskAnal. 341 (1997).
7 See Philip Nicholas Johnson-Laird, Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive
Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness (1983); see also Helmut
Jungermann et al., Mental Models in Risk Assessment: Informing People About
Drugs, 8 RiskAnal. 147 (1988).
10 Risk Health, Safety & Environment 45 [Winter 1999]

and misconceptions." 8 A mental model may emphasize
understanding interrelationships, an expert influence diagram goes
beyond understanding to show the risk control decision points. Carley
refers to the models as maps and presents statistical as well as graphical
representations of mental models. 9 Others refer to the development
and presentation of mental models as concept maps. 10 The variation in
terminology suggests flexibility for representing, analyzing, and
comparing mental models.
The elicitation task for creating an expert mental model depends
primarily on complexity and scientific consensus. Concepts with a
strong scientific consensus require less effort to elicit than concepts
which experts disagree on, and perhaps should even be approached
differently. This contrast can be seen in the work of Bostrom et al. and
Morgan. 1 1 For example, Bostrom et al. found that multiple experts
concurred with their expert influence diagram (mental model) of "Risk
of Radon in a House with a Crawlspace" constructed by a single
physicist. However, greater complexity and less scientific consensus led
Morgan to plan an intensive survey of a "small number of leading
ecologists" for constructing a model of how global climate change will
12
affect ecosystems.
The purpose of the work can help in choosing among elicitation
methods. Kempton used ethnographic interviews to study lay
perceptions of climate change. 13 Carley employs a more structured
verbal protocol approach for eliciting a mental model, losing freedom
in exchange for standardizing her data. 14 Bostrom et al. explore native
8 Ann Bostrom, et al., CharacterizingMental Models of Hazardous Processes: A
Methodology and an Application to Radon, 48 J. Soc. Issues 89 (1992).
9 See Kathleen Carley, Extracting, Representing, and Analyzing Mental Models,
70 Social Forces 601 (1992).
10 See Allen Brent Griffith, A Contingent Valuation Analysis of the Value of
Tropical Rain Forest Protection by Pennsylvania Citizens (1991) (Masters' Thesis);
Joseph D. Novak & Bob Gowin, Learning How to Learn (1984).
11 Bostrom et al., supra note 8; Morgan Granger, Carnegie Mellon University,
personal communication.
12 Id.
13 See Willet Kempton, Lay Perspectives on Global Climate Change, 1 Global
Envtl. Change 183 (1991).
14 Carley, supra note 9. The verbal protocol method is described in K. Anders
Ericsson & Herbert A. Simon, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (1984); see
also Gordon B. Willis et al., The Use of Verbal Protocols in the Development and
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concepts through one-on-one interviews and then uses the results to
develop a protocol that begins with open-ended questions and ends
with more directed ones. 15 Extending the work of Bostrom et al.,
Read et al. developed a written survey, generating a larger standardized
16
data set.
After elicitation, results for each individual can then be represented
as a mental model. These mental models can be compared, integrating
shared meanings into a general model. 17 The lay mental model can be
compared to the expert influence diagram to reveal "correct, incorrect,
peripheral, background evaluative, and nonspecific" concepts. 18 This
information can provide a basis for developing risk communications.
Bostrom et al. compared mental models by coding transcriptions of lay
open-ended interviews on radon risks into an expert influence diagram.
Bostram et al. identified (1) misconceptions, (2) peripheral beliefs (i.e.
correct but not particularly relevant), (3) indiscriminate beliefs (i.e.
19
correct but imprecise), (4) background beliefs, and (5) valuations.
The concept map approach develops a schematic representation of a
set of concept meanings embedded in a framework of propositions.
The propositions are simple statements describing the relationship
between concepts. 20 The concept map is an attempt to clearly and
concisely present an individual's perceptions regarding the relationships
between key ideas for a specific topic. The concept map taps the
individual's cognitive structure and visually presents what the person
knows. Externalized expression of propositions makes concept maps
21
effective for showing understanding as well as misconceptions.
Concept maps can be used to identify misconceptions when nonexpert concepts involve a linkage between two concepts that lead to a
Testing of Survey Questionnaires,5 Applied Cognitive Psych. 251 (1991).
15 See Bostrom et al., supra note 8; See also Ann Bostrom, et al., What Do
People Know About Climate Change? 1. Mental Models, 14 RiskAnal. 959 (1994).
16

See Daniel Read et al.,
What Do People Know About Climate Change? 2.

Survey Studies of Educated Laypeople, 14 RiskAnal. 970 (1994).
17

See Carley, supra note 9.

18 Baruch Fischhoff et al., Risk Perception and Communication, 14 Ann. Rev. of
Pub. Health 195 (1993).

19 See Bostrom et al., supra note 8.
20 See Novak & Gowin, supra note 10.
21 See Novak & Gowin, supra note 10 at 20.
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false relationship or proposition, or a gap that misses key relationships
between two or more concepts. Concept maps can be used to
determine specific ways for organizing and presenting information,
addressing misconceptions, and separating trivial from important
information.
Concept maps are hierarchical, with more general, inclusive topics at
the top. Moving down the map, the concepts and relationships
progressively become more specific and less inclusive. Arrowed lines can
show both the linking of concepts and the direction of the relationship.
Specific examples can be provided at the bottom. The complexity of
the map can be measured by the overall level of detail, depth, and
breadth of the map. Depth refers to the vertical strings of propositions,
and breadth refers to the number of propositions provided horizontally.
Based on these criteria, different maps can be ranked and compared.
Because they are flexible in construction and application, knowledge
elicitation techniques that enable representation of mental models as
concept maps can be customized to specific research needs. Mental
models and concept map analysis are efficient and effective
communication mate rials that can educate the public on important
issues with the goal of improving decision making and policy processes.
Expert Mental Models of Ecosystems
We did not rely on a single expert to develop an influence diagram
because at this stage we were more interested in determining the degree
of expert consensus than in identifying risk control points. "Ecosystem"
is a very broad concept. Consequently, there are a multitude of
pathways that allow various factors to impact ecosystems. This suggests
that understanding risks requires a broad conceptual map of
ecosystems. Our early investigation showed a lack of consensus among
experts in how they discuss and conceive ecosystems. Anticipating
difficulties in eliciting a consensus expert mental model, we adapted
22
the Bostrom et al. procedure.
We started with a focus group of five university professors having
expertise in aquatic and wetland ecology, forestry, and watershed
management. 2 3 Such diversity provided balance and depth to the
22 See Bostrom et al., supra note 8.
23 See William H. Desvousges & V. Kerry Smith, Focus Groups and Risk
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initial mental model and a check for the subsequent results. Participants
were asked to discuss what "ecosystem" means. Their various responses
suggested that the term ecosystem is extremely elastic and requires
context and classification.
One particularly elastic aspect is scale. The ecologists discussed the
ecosystem for a worm as having a relatively small scale, while the
ecosystem of a migratory duck can span North, Central, and South
America. Then the group was asked to describe and diagram the
components of an ecosystem. Using the diagram and their suggestions,
a group mental model was developed. The experts briefly discussed
important interconnections between elements in the model, specific
processes by which the elements interact, and how those processes
dictate the way the entire system works.
Using the terminology obtained from the focus group, a set of
"concept cards" was created. Each card represented one term from the
focus group mental model. In one-on-one interviews, six university
ecologists were shown a concept map on meat quality as an example of
a concept map. 24 Each were then asked to arrange the concept cards as
they saw fit in relation to the term ecosystem. We encouraged each
expert to add missing cards or remove nonessential cards. Once the
cards were arranged, interconnections and relationships were drawn
with lines and arrows and described in words. A concept map was
drawn for each interview.
To ensure the reliability of the technique and validate the interview
results, we used blank concept cards in the final one-on-one interview.
The presentation was the same, but the expert was instructed to develop
the concepts for each card. The results were similar to the previous
sessions, indicating that the concept card method provides the desired
level of information.
The individual interviews added depth and revealed more complex
relationships compared with the findings of the focus group. The focus
group model displayed the components that make up an ecosystem
and their fundamental organization. The individual interviews revealed
Communication: The "Science" of Listening to the Data, 8 Risk Anal. 479 (1988);
see also Richard A Krueger, Focus Groups, A Practical Guide for Applied Research
(2d ed. 1994).
24 See Novak & Gowin, supra note 10.
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that the concept of processes (e.g., nutrient cycling, energy cycling, and
evolution) needed to be included because of the relationships among
elements. Furthermore, the description of an ecosystem varies
depending on the specific process being considered.
Figure 1
Expert Consensus Mental Model
CECOSYSTEMS

Experts perceive ecosystems as being made up of fundamental
elements that are hierarchically organized. However, these elements
interrelate infinitely. While the experts' viewpoints can be integrated so
that the fundamental organization of an ecosystem is defined,
"ecosystems" themselves are not easily defined. A simple elemental
model is inadequate for completely describing an ecosystem, because it
is of limited dimension and is static. A simple two-dimensional
elemental model may capture the basic conceptual framework and be
adapted to other dimensions. The result is a generalized expert
"consensus" mental model of the elements of an ecosystem that
provides the basis for comparing lay and experts' perceptions.
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The expert consensus mental model in Figure 1 was developed by
identifying shared meanings among the six mental models derived
from the one-on-one interviews. This did not include the model from
the focus group that may have been influenced by the interactions
between experts. Any concept that was present in 50% or more of the
expert models was included in the general model. The literature does
not suggest a cutoff point, but the frequency of concepts tended to
cluster well below or well above 50%.
Developing the expert consensus model solidified findings from the
expert focus group. Although each expert has their own view, common
characteristics emerged. The biotic and abiotic elements of increasing
depth are common to all experts, and interconnections between the
elements of the model dictate how the entire system functions.
"Processes" can take various forms such as evolution, energy,
nutrient, or water cycling. Therefore, we focused on components at this
stage of our research. Abiotic components are generally categorized into
atmosphere, hydrosphere, and geologic components. Edaphic
components (i.e., related to or determined by conditions of the soil)
were separately identified in the focus group and most one-on-one
interviews. These components can be combined to define other
common concepts raised by experts, such as climate, microclimate,
physiography and topography. These concepts relate more to
descriptions of ecosystem characteristics than components. Biotic
components were generally modeled by experts in terms of "highest" to
"lowest" level: from community to species to population to organism.
Although this model is presented in a static, two-dimensional
framework, it is truly n-dimensional and dynamic: Each ecosystem
process has a unique elemental hierarchy and design. The expert
consensus model simply summarizes the main concepts in a general
framework for comparison with the layperson consensus mental model.
Layperson Mental Models Of Ecosystems
Focus Groups and ProtocolDevelopment
Elicitation of lay perceptions of ecosystems began with four focus
groups totaling 26 subjects (groups 1 through 4 with 8, 8, 4, and 6
participants, respectively). Recruited in central Pennsylvania through an
advertisement in a local newspaper, participants only knew they were to
10 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 45 [Wimter 1999]

discuss "local policy issues." We had no a priori indication of whether
"ecosystem" would be a term laypeople easily recognize or understand.
The discussion in the first two focus groups centered on five
themes: (1) understanding of interrelationships; (2) characterizing an
ecosystem; (3) balance and sustainability; (4) global climate change
risks to ecosystems; and (5) environment versus ecosystem. The first
two focus groups suggested the need for more effort on our part to
extract what individuals think about nature, ecosystems, and ecosystem
change. They also reinforced the usefulness of eliciting comparisons
between the concepts of "environment" and "ecosystem."
Focus groups 3 and 4 began with each participant listing parts and
characteristics of an ecosystem, and explaining how to group the parts.
This process was similar to that conducted with the expert group. The
lay focus groups revealed that, although "ecosystem" is not an
unfamiliar term, they had difficulty defining it. They perceive
ecosystems as complex, interrelated, and bounded areas that are
difficult to characterize. Thought processes were elicited about what
comprises an ecosystem. By having them group the parts and
characteristics, we could examine concepts of complexity,
interrelationships, and scale. The grouping provided a schematic of the
parts and their interrelationships, an initial mental model for laypeople.
These focus groups results were used to design the protocol for one-onone interviews to elicit layperson mental models of ecosystems.
One-on-One Layperson Interviews
Thirty-two central Pennsylvania residents were recruited through a
newspaper advertisement and random digit dialing. Respondents were
paid $20; the interviews lasted between 45 minutes and two hours. The
one-on-one interview protocol combined "focus interviews"
(unstructured discussion of the survey topic) and "free and dimensional
sorts" (respondents sort lists or similar items into groups that go
25
together and rank the items according to specified scales).
The first section of the protocol used open-ended questions to elicit
individuals' concepts of the parts and groupings of ecosystem
components (Figure 2). In the first nine one-on-one interviews, we
25 See Jared B. Jobe & David J. Mingay, Cognitive Research Improves
Questionnaire,79 Am. J. of Pub. Health 1053 (1989).
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elicited information for developing a diagram of a consensus lay mental
model of ecosystems. The balance of the interviews covered the same
material but did not include individuals diagramming their mental
model. We used a "parts and grouping" method similar to that for
eliciting the expert mental model. We found a basic similarity among
the individual groupings. Each individual included some form of at
least three of the following group headings: life, earth, air, and water.
We label this an Aristotelian model of an ecosystem. The layperson
models range from the simple Aristotelian model to intricate models
resembling the complexity of the expert mental models.
Figure 2
Layperson Parts and Grouping Protocol
Methods
Parts
I would like for you to start by listing the parts and/or characteristics of an ecosystem.
--Is there a difference between parts and characteristics?
Explain the significance of each of these items.
Grouping
If you were to organize these into groups, how would you do so?
-- Why did you pick these groups?
-- Terms can be in more than one group.
--There is no minimum to the number in one group.
--Is there anything else you need to know before establishing these groups?

Figure 3 presents the consensus layperson mental model derived
from the first nine one-on-one interviews. It relies on the same process
as used in the expert mental model. Any concept present in 50% or
more of the individual models was included in the consensus layperson
model. Unlike the experts, laypeople seldom mentioned a dichotomy
between living and non-living; perhaps it seemed too obvious to
mention. Most individuals revealed breadth similar to that shown in
Figure 3, but there were significant differences in the depth of their
mental models.
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Figure 3
Layperson Consensus Mental Model

Plants

AnimalsAi

CHWae

. nrelatinships

The consensus lay mental model shows that while laypeople are
unfamiliar with expert terminology for specific ecosystem concepts,
they recognize the importance and significance of interrelationships.
Specifically, laypeople note that disturbances to one element can
disrupt the entire system.
ContentAnalysis ofLayperson One-on-One Interviews
We used content analysis to examine the layperson consensus
mental model. All 32 one-on-one interviews were recorded and
transcribed, with the interviewers' questions and neutral prompts
removed from the transcript. A ranked word frequency list was created
using a document search program developed with the statistics
program, SAS. The program was used to remove articles (e.g., the, that,
a); prepositions (e.g., of, to, in); pronouns (e.g., I, they, we); and
conjunctions (e.g., and, but, so). Plurals and singulars of the same root
word were combined, as were words with common meaning (e.g.
interacts, connected, linked, and interconnected were recoded to
interrelationships). The top 16 words are listed in Table 1 by frequency,
26
including the number of the respondents who mentioned each word.
Table 1 also lists illustrative quotes to provide context for each term.
26 Individual counts for these 16 words for each interviewee are available from the

lead author.
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Table 1
Word Count Totals (32 Respondents) and Examples of Context from One-on-One
Layperson Interviews
Word(s)

Frequency

Number
OfIndividuals
Mentioning Term

Things(s)

215

28

"Things working together.
The species all working
together to make an
ecosystem-'

Water

164

27

"I mean quality of both of
them. I can't really think of
anything else other than
water and air and greenhouse
what else could I mean."

Interrelationships

94

23

"Its interrelation between
plants and animals, you know
ow they relate to one
another; you know it's like an
interwoven concept."

Environment

91

20

"The environment, generally,
and how one phase of the
environment, one aspect of
the environment affects other
aspects of the environment."

People

86

22

"I do see it as a whole
system and probably people
should be in there too, I
mean I guess we could go
along with us being fauna
also, but we don't really think

Quote

of us that way."

Animals

83

21

"It is the whole link between
the plants, the animals, the
food, the air, and the water
that kind of addresses my
concept of what an
ecosystem has to be."

Air

82

24

"The ecosystem has to have
air."
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Table 1 (continued)

...................................................................

Word(s)

...................

Frequency

Number
OfIndividuals
Mentioning Term

Quote

Earth

81

13

"The ecosystem is probably
the whole earth maybe and
then you break down into
different ecosystems.

Plants

72

21

"The exchange of plants
giving off the oxygen and we
give off the carbon dioxide.
Isn't that what an ecosystem
is all about?"

Life

53

19

"Everything in the system
itself. The water, the air, the
food, the life."

Everything

51

19

"Everything that comes to
mind is essentially
everything. It is a web.
Everything is connected to
everything else. Air, land,
water, it affects everything
else no matter where it is."

Fish

50

14

"An ecosystem would involve
our affecting fish by what we
place into the environment."

Humans

46

11

"I would include human
beings in the ecosystem."

Trees

43

16

"My thoughts on an
ecosystem are the fact that
you have to have plants to
maintain the soil. Plants are
necessary.

Land

38

9

"Well, land, air, water
systems, oceans, the whole
environment."

Processes

36

6

"...the word "system" infers
that there is a process. Plants
producing oxygen & waste
producing CO 2 so plants
are sustained."
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Factor analysis was applied to the word count data to understand
laypeople's shared meanings by reducing many perceptions and
judgments into common explanatory factors. 27 Principal components
analysis was used first to determine the number of factors to retain. Six
eigenvalues greater than one indicated that six should be kept. Next,
varimax rotation was used to derive their factor loadings. Table 2
summarizes the results for the sixteen most frequently used concepts
Each of the six factors was labeled according to the elements it
contains. Factor 1, which we label "Biotic", explains 29% of the
variation in subjects' responses. This factor includes plants and animals
identified as "living" in Figure 3. It also includes the concepts
"humans", "interrelationships", and "processes". Contrary to the
qualitative conclusion that interrelationships are suggested to occur
between all elements of the mental model, the factor analysis suggests
that individuals view and describe the interrelationships as mainly
occurring between and within the biotic components of an ecosystem.
This does not imply that laypeople do not recognize interrelationships
within the abiotic components and between all elements of an
ecosystem; rather, they understand and describe the biotic
interrelationships more often and more clearly.
Factor 2, "Abiotic", explains over 12% of the variance and includes
air and water, which show up on the right side of Figure 3. Also
included in the abiotic factor is the term "things". This suggests the
difficulty laypeople have labeling specific elements of ecosystems
beyond a general level. For example, one subject responded to the
interviewer's question of what is and makes up an ecosystem with, "I
think of it as a group, the whole thing. Then there are the separate
things...". Another subject suggested that, "we have really interrupted
many things in the ecosystem."
The third factor, "People", describes the importance that laypeople
place upon the biotic component of ecosystems, specifically related to
human beings. It is interesting to note that this concept is distinct from
"humans" in the "Biotic Factor" (Factor 1). Also, the concept "life" is
associated with people and not with the biotic concepts in Factor 1.
27 See Samuel Shye et al., Introduction to Facet Theory: Content Design and
Intrinsic Data Analysis in Behavioral Research (1994); see also Larry Hatcher, A
Step-by-Step Approach to Using the SAS System for Factor Analysis and Structural
Equation Modeling (1994).
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Table 2
Factor Analysis: Most Frequent 16 Words (32 Respondents)
Factors
"Biotic" 'Abiotic"
Factor 1 Factor 2

Words
Interrelationships
Processes
Humans
Animals
Plants

92
87
83
82
73

Air
Water
Things

87

"Soil"
Factor 4

"Fish"
Factor 5

"Trees"
Factor 6

73
54

People

88

Life
.....................

"People.
Factor 3

57
.

...................................................................................................................................................

Land

86

Earth

64

Everything
Fish

50

86

Trees
Environment
Variance explained
by each factor:

90
51

29.0%

12.6%

10.9%

10.0%

9.6%

9.0%

Total Variance Explained: 81.1%
Factor loadings are shown multiplied by 100. Those below 40 are omitted from the table.
Labels for factors are discussed in the text.

The fourth factor, "Soil", supports the conclusion from the
consensus lay mental model that individuals see the soil as a distinct
component, containing direct links and interactions between the abiotic
and biotic components. Mhile the two elements of the factor are earth
and land specifically, we label the factor soil because of the context in
which the subjects mentioned earth and land. For instance, one
individual said, "they keep depleting the soil and the earth."
Factors 5 and 6 pick up two additional biotic components, fish and
trees, respectively. Fish and trees associate with the concepts

"everything" and "environment", respectively, but not strongly with the
other biotic components in Factors 1 and 3 (e.g., animals or plants).
The consensus lay mental model of an ecosystem (Figure 3)
suggests a division between two distinct groups of factors similar to the
expert mental model: the biotic, Factors 1, 3, 5, and 6, and the abiotic,
Factors 2 and 4. To explore a possible dichotomy, we forced the 16
word matrix to fit into only two factors to see if these would fit nicely
into "biotic" and "abiotic" factors (see Table 3).
Table 3
Constrained "Two Factor" Analysis of Primary Word List (32 Respondents)
Factor 1

Factor 2

92 (1)
89 (1)
85 (1)
76 (1)
73 (1)
69 (4)
54 (6)
49 (3)
26 (4)

Interrelationships
Processes
Humans
Animals
Plants
Earth
Environment
Life
Land

80 (3)
64 (2)
63 (5)
56 (5)
49 (2)
42 (6)
12(2)

People
Water
Fish
Everything
Things
Trees
Air
Variance explained by each factor

30.2%

15.1%

Factor loadings are shown multiplied by 100. The numbers in parentheses indicate
which factor the word loaded on in the unconstrained factor analysis (see Table 2).

The results suggest that individuals may not simply dichotomize
the world into living and non-living. Factors 1 and 4 from the
unconstrained factor analysis grouped into one factor and Factors 2 and
5 into another. Factors 3 and 6 from the unconstrained analysis split
into the two factors in the constrained analysis. One interpretation
would be that individuals have a richer set of concepts of the structures
and relationships within ecosystems than the simple dichotomous
"biotic" and "abiotic". The total variance explained in the constrained
factor analysis (45.3%) suggests that the six factors of the
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unconstrained factor analysis, as shown in Table 2 (81.1% variance
explained), better describe the structure of individuals' mental models.
The results of the factor analysis lend quantitative support to the
qualitative development of the consensus lay mental model shown in
Figure 3. Furthermore, combining the results of the factor analysis with
quotes from the individual interviews offers suggestions for how and
why individual components and elements emerged in the order and
organization of the consensus lay mental model.
Conclusions
Previous literature implied that developing an expert mental model
would be straightforward and the depth and breadth of expert
knowledge would produce a detailed representation of ecosystems. The
complexity of ecosystems makes mental modeling more difficult than
anticipated. Despite diversity among ecologists' views, individual
expert models reveal a consistent level of breadth and depth and a
consistent set of component elements. Our consensus expert mental
model captures this in a static or hierarchical perspective, but can be
expanded to a dynamic, multidimensional perspective when viewed
from different ecosystem processes. These common themes are
expressed as the consensus mental model of Figure 1. It may be crucial
to include processes more explicitly in the mental model
representation.
In general, laypeople are unsure what ecosystems are. Even so, they
reveal a notion of natural systems and processes that may be called their
ecosystem mental model. Generally, laypeople revealed similar breadth
in their mental models, but the depth of elements and complexity of
2
interrelationships varied significantly among individuals. 8
Interrelationships represent an important common idea between expert
and layperson models. Experts can explain the interrelationships (e.g.,
which elements are interrelated, how they are interrelated, and why
they are interrelated). In general, laypeople can only express that there
28

See Peter Reimann & Michelene T. H. Chi, Human Expertise, Human and

Machine Problem Solving (K. J. Gilhooly, ed. 1989). At 173, comparing novice and

expert understanding of concepts in physics, they state that "experts have developed
several layers of this hierarchy, whereas only the first level of the hierarchy seems to be
developed for the very beginning novices. As skill is developed, the hierarchy develops

into a complete tree with many levels of embedding."

are interrelationships. This research suggests that many individuals have
difficulty explaining the basic elements of ecosystems and interactions
among the elements. Furthermore, elements and interactions that
laypeople perceive as minuscule and less valuable may be of the utmost
importance and value from the expert perspective.
The protocol developed to elicit individuals' mental models
focused on components of ecosystems using a "parts and grouping"
approach because of the difficulty individuals had in expressing an
understanding of ecosystem processes. As revealed in the individual
interviews, laypeople are aware that ecosystems involve significant
interactions. Risks to "components", such as threats to individual
endangered species, may be relatively easy to communicate. However,
communication about several types of ecosystem risks needs to focus on
inherent interdependencies and processes. Risks involving complex
processes, such as sub-lethal impacts of hazardous chemicals or changes
in stream temperature due to logging that affect aquatic biota, likely
require more in-depth efforts to communicate the nature of the risks.
Regarding risk communication issues, Paul Slovic found that people
(1) often have inaccurate risk perceptions, (2) are frightened or
frustrated by risk information, (3) have strong beliefs that are resistant
to modification and (4) are open to manipulation when they lack strong
prior opinions. Based on the limited sample examined here, we expect
that, with respect to ecosystem risks, (1) lack of prior knowledge will
make people more apt to have inaccurate risk perceptions of ecosystem
processes than ecosystem components, (2) communications about
ecosystem risks are likely to frustrate and/or frighten laypeople because
of the complexity and magnitude of ecosystem risks and laypeople's
perception of a fundamental reliance on ecosystems, (3) people do not
have strong beliefs about ecosystems and are open to information
regarding ecosystem risks, and (4) because of the lack of prior
knowledge regarding ecosystem processes, laypeople are susceptible to
29
manipulation in communication about ecosystem risks.
Similar to the results of other mental models research, we found
that lay mental models are less specific and more general than the
expert mental model. 3 0 In contrast to mental modeling of radon
29 See Paul Slovic, Informing and Educating the Public About Risk, 6 Risk Anal.
403 (1986).
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exposure, laypeople did not reveal specific misperceptions (in the sense
of counterfactual information) that conflict with the expert mental
model of ecosystems. At the same time, the less detailed breadth and
depth shows gaps in the lay mental model, and a focus that maybe
inappropriate for some ecosystem risks. Generally, individuals recognize
that their knowledge of ecosystem processes is limited. Combined with
a deep concern for ecosystem risks, laypeople were very receptive to
information about ecosystem impacts. This suggests that risk
communication efforts may be productive in informing them about
ecosystem risks if carefully, e.g., non-manipulatively, designed. 3 1 The
results from this study provide a starting point for designing such
communications. More generally, the results suggest the potential for
the mental modeling approach to assist in designing effective risk
communication by identifying commonalities and differences between
lay and expert mental models of ecosystems and ecosystem risk.

30 See Jean Bddard & Michelene T. H. Chi, Expertise, 1 Current Directions in
Psych. Sci. 135, 136 (1992) ("expert's knowledge is extensively cross-referenced, with
a rich network among concepts. Novices have fewer and weaker links among
concepts.")
31 See Milton Russell, Risk Communication: On the Road to Maturity,
Evaluation and Effective Risk Communications Workshop Proceedings, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (Ann Fisher et al., eds. 1991) (a discussion of
circumstances under which some forms of manipulative risk communication might be
socially acceptable).

